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A bit over half a century ago, the United States under the Nixon administration sent its then-State Secretary Henry Kissinger to China in order to exploit the infamous Sino-Soviet split that nearly escalated into a full-blown war between Moscow and Beijing.
The “cold war” between the two previously closely allied communist powers was a strategic gift to the US-led political West, as the belligerent thalassocracy was terrified of the prospect of facing a giant Eurasian monolith spanning from East Germany to Vietnam. The brewing ideological conflict between the post-Stalinist Soviet Union and Maoist China was heavily (ab)used by the US to somewhat soften the consequences of the humiliating defeat of America’s genocidal aggression in Indochina, where millions were killed in its indiscriminate attacks on Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
Henry Kissinger is often credited as the instrumental figure in engineering the Sino-American detente that gave the US much-needed geopolitical breathing room in the late 1970s and much of the 1980s after the belligerent thalassocracy pulled back to “lick its Vietnam wounds”. However, it should be noted that, despite Kissinger’s vast diplomatic experience and knowledge, the very fact that the early 1970s China was still largely isolationist, as well as in the process of recovering from the consequences of WWII and the Cultural Revolution, made his efforts significantly easier. Still, thanks to Kissinger, the Nixon administration achieved a major diplomatic win that lasted until the very end of the Cold War and was completely nullified only by the recent suicidal US foreign policy.
Back in the 1970s, it would’ve been almost entirely unimaginable that Henry Kissinger, quite literally a historical figure at this point, not only due to his Cold War-era achievements, but also his advanced age (now in triple digits), would have to engage in his “shuttle” and “triangular diplomacy” concepts once again. However, precisely this happened last week, culminating with Kissinger’s meeting with Xi Jinping himself on July 20. The Chinese President even called the centenarian “an old friend of China”. Owing to the Asian giant’s great attention to detail, particularly when it comes to diplomatic protocols, the meeting was held at the Villa 5 of the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, the exact same place where Kissinger met the then-Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1971.
Precisely that meeting was instrumental in preparing Richard Nixon’s visit to China next year. However, that’s where the historical parallels end. Despite the reputation, influence and respect that he enjoys in China and worldwide, Kissinger went to Beijing in an unofficial capacity. Not representing the US anymore, he was largely relieved of the burden and responsibility for America’s diplomatic standing in China, a far cry from what it used to be during the (First) Cold War. The situation has changed drastically since Kissinger’s tenure, as the Asian giant is anything but a poor, underdeveloped nation with major ideological identity issues that could be exploited to further US interests. On the contrary, precisely Washington DC is the side that’s been going through major internal issues and waning global influence.
In this regard, Kissinger’s room for maneuver was extremely narrow, despite the overall cordiality of his hosts. Beijing is perfectly aware of the rabid hostility and ever-growing Sinophobia in Washington DC, as well as the fact that the belligerent thalassocracy will not change its course anytime soon. Whether it’s the lies about China’s supposed “spy balloon”, apparent doom and gloom propaganda about its alleged “strategic military advantage” or the numerous statements by the Pentagon about the “inevitable war with China“, Beijing is certainly prepared for any scenario and contingency, including the deployment of its forces in “America’s backyard”. This is despite Washington DC’s attempts to resuscitate its Monroe Doctrine, largely dormant up until the recent contraction of America’s geopolitical influence.
There’s only so much Kissinger could do given the active US threats that it will place China’s breakaway island province of Taiwan under its nuclear umbrella, a move that would be tantamount to a declaration of war. Beijing has already started to push back against not only the ongoing US aggression in the Asia-Pacific region, aided by its numerous vassals and satellite states (as well as some “Trojan horses” that have previously declared their intention of joining BRICS+), but also the openly announced involvement of NATO. Since the start of Russia’s special military operation (SMO), the belligerent alliance has repeatedly called China a “security threat” and has clearly defined it as such at its recent summit in Lithuania’s Vilnius. The US-led political West is desperate to keep its wanton “rules-based world order” on life support for as long as possible.
The consolidation and partial relegation of America’s geopolitical responsibilities to its vassals are the crucial segments of this controversial approach, and precisely China’s regional adversaries are poised to play a critical role in this regard. It’s wholly impossible for any US diplomat (former or current), even Kissinger himself, to offer any sort of detente with China while the US keeps talking, bragging even, that it will continue with its “strategic containment” policies, as well as arming not only Beijing’s neighbors, but also its breakaway province. This is without even considering the fact that two consecutive US administrations have been trying to derail China’s unparalleled economic and technological rise, a move that China only recently answered to with limited rare-earth elements restrictions. For these reasons, Kissinger’s attempts to create and then exploit another “Sino-Soviet split” are doomed to fail.
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Drago Bosnic is an independent geopolitical and military analyst.
Featured image is from InfoBrics
