Top Secret U.S. Army Document Reveals U.S. Interference in Venezuela’s Political Affairs

Inasmuch as Venezuela is the fifth largest oil producer in the world, and the third largest supplier to the United States, it appears plausible to conclude that oil must be a significant factor in the US drive to effect regime change in the country. Yet Washington has opposed governments and movements throughout Latin America and elsewhere in the world with equal determination, without oil or any other resource being a factor. Hugo Chavez is against the excesses of US foreign policy and globalization and has let the world know this, which makes it plain to Washington that he’s not of suitable client material. For the empire to let him get away with this would be to set a very bad example for other non-believers. 

William Blum, Freeing the World to Death: Essays on the American Empire [Monroe, ME, Common Courage Press, 2005] pp. 181-182.

Top Secret U.S. Army Document Reveals U.S. Interference in Venezuela’s Political Affairs by Roy S. Carson

by Roy S. Carson

Vheadline.com

December 02, 2004 http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23802

VHeadline.com today publishes a top secret US Army document as a matter of public concern, relating to continuing belligerent interference by the United States of America in Venezuela’s domestic political affairs

VHeadline.com editor & publisher Roy S. Carson writes: As a matter of public concern, especially where it relates to continuing belligerent United States of America interference in Venezuela’s domestic political affairs and its not-so-covert support for anti-democratic forces within Venezuela weeking to overthrow the legitimate government of President Hugo Chavez Frias, VHeadline.com Venezuela today responsibly publishes (without permission) a top secret US Army document distributed to top Washington D.C. officials only last month in which United States’ Counterinsurgency Operations are described in the form of a manual.

Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to the DOD and DOD contractors only to maintain operations security. This determination was made on 1 April 2004. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-CD (FMI 3-07.22), 1 Reynolds Avenue (Building 111), Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352.

Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

In an introduction, the document, which is available here in its 182-page entirety as a PDF file, informs its readers that “The American way of war includes mass, power, and the use of sophisticated smart weapons. However, large main force engagements that characterized conflict in World War II, Korea, and Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom in the Middle East have become the exceptions in American warfare. Since the American Revolution, the Army has conducted stability operations, which have included counter-insurgency operations. Over the past half-century alone, the Army gained considerable experience in fighting insurgents in Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Philippines), Latin America (Colombia, Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua), Africa (Somalia), Southwest Asia (Afghanistan), and now the Middle East (Iraq).

Dealing with counterinsurgency since the Vietnam War has fallen largely on SOF; however, conventional forces have frequently come into contact with insurgent forces that seek to neutralize the inherent advantages of size, weaponry, and conventional force TTP.

Insurgents use a combination of actions that include terror, assassination, kidnapping, murder, guerrilla tactics such as ambushes, booby traps, and improvised explosive devices aimed at US and multinational forces, the host country’s leaders, and ordinary citizens.

The stunning victory over Saddam Hussein’s army in 2003 validated US conventional force TTP, but the ensuing aftermath of instability has caused review of lessons from the Army’s historical experience and those of the other services and multinational partners. One of the key recurring lessons is that the United States cannot win other countries’ wars for them, but can certainly help legitimate foreign governments overcome attempts to overthrow them. US forces can assist a country confronted by an insurgency by providing a safe and secure environment at the local level and continuously building on the incremental success.

The impetus for this FMI came from the Iraq insurgency and the realization that engagements in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) would likely use counterinsurgency TTPs. Consequently this FMI reviews what we know about counterinsurgency and explains the fundamentals of military operations in a counterinsurgency environment.

DEFINITION OF INSURGENCY

1-1. An insurgency is organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). It is a protracted politicomilitary struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control. Political power is the central issue in an insurgency.

1-2. Each insurgency has its own unique characteristics based on its strategic objectives, its operational environment, available resources, operational method, and tactics (For example, an insurgency may be based on mass mobilization through political action or the FOCO theory. Insurgencies frequently seek to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country.

1-3. The goal of an insurgency is to mobilize human and material resources in order to form an alternative to the state. This alternative is called the counterstate. The counterstate may have much of the infrastructure possessed by the state itself, but this must normally be hidden, since it is illegal. Thus the counterstate is often referred to by the term “clandestine infrastructure.” As the insurgents gain confidence and power, the clandestine infrastructure may become more open, as observed historically in communist regions during the Chinese Revolution, in South Vietnam after the North Vietnamese 1972 Easter Offensive, and in Colombia in the summer of 1998.

1-4. Successful mobilization provides active and passive support for the insurgency’s programs, operations, and goals. At the national level, mobilization grows out of dissatisfaction by some elite members with existing political, economic, or social conditions. At the regional level, members of an elite have become marginalized (that is, they have become psychologically alienated from the system), and have established links with followers by bringing them into the counterstate. At the local, district and province-levels, local movement representatives called the cadre address local grievances and do recruiting. The cadre gives credit to the insurgent movement for all local solutions. Loyalty to the insurgent movement is normally won through deeds but may occur through appeal to abstract principles. Promises to end hunger or eliminate poverty may appeal to a segment of the population, while appeals to eliminate a foreign presence or establish a government based on religious or political ideology may appeal to others. Nonetheless, these promises and appeals are associated with tangible solutions and deeds.

The complete document is available as PDF at: http://www.vheadline.com/USA-counterinsurgency-operations.pdf

Copyright © 2004 VHeadline.com All Rights Reserved.

MIAMI CONNECTION FOUND IN ASSASSINATION OF VENEZUELAN STATE PROSECUTOR

December 02, 2004 http://venezuelanalysis.com/news.php?newsno=1434

By Gregory Wilpert

Venezuelanalysis.com

Caracas, December 2, 2004–Investigators in the case of the assassination of Venezuela’s most controversial state prosecutor, Danilo Anderson, has found that telephone records of key suspects lead to Miami. According to the investigators, the assassination was planned at a meeting in Miami this past September.

One of the participants at this meeting was Jose Augustin Guevara, another brother of the two Guevara brothers who have already been arrested in connection with the case. The other Guevara family member to have been arrested, Juan Bautista Guevara, is a cousin of the three brothers and is suspected of having planted the bomb on Danilo Anderson’s car. Eyewitnesses place him at the scene shortly before Anderson’s car exploded.

Jose Guevara, the eldest of the three Guevara brothers, has been living in Miami since 2001, when he was detained by the FBI in connection with the search for Peru’s fleeing spy chief, Vladimiro Montesinos. The FBI had detained him for attempting to withdraw money from one of Montesinos’ bank accounts. It is said that the Guevara brothers were paid $1 million for hiding Montesinos in Venezuela, while he was on the run from Peruvian justice, where he was wanted in connection with corruption and human rights abuses.

Jose Guevara was released by the FBI shortly after his detention and has ever since been in under FBI protection as a witness.

Attorney General’s Office to take over investigation from the police

Venezuela’s Attorney General’s Office has removed the investigation of the Anderson murder from the country’s investigative police because of irregularities that have occurred during the investigation. The investigation will now be conducted by the same team that is investigating the April 2002 coup attempt.

One of the reasons for the move is that investigators from the Attorney General’s office have raised concerns that the investigative police, the CICPC, has been leaking information to suspects, due to some officer’s close ties to the Guevara brothers, who once were members of the investigative police themselves.

Also, a number of irregularities have occurred during the investigation, so that several searches and raids were conducted without the presence of officials from the Public Ministry, as is required by law.

A recent raid on Caracas’ Jewish school (Club Hebraica) raised eyebrows and outrage among many Venezuelans and especially the opposition because it is a school for children and any connection with the Anderson case seemed remote at best. Later, though, investigators said that they searched the school because a suspicion had been raised that weapons that were stored at a shooting club, Club Magnum, had been transported and hidden at the school. The police, however, did not find anything at the school. Another reason the incident caused consternation is that at this raid too no representative of the Public Ministry was present.

The investigation will be supplemented by other CICPC officers from the homicide division, who do not have any personal relationship with the arrested Guevara brothers.

Based on information from Ultimas Noticias and El Mundo

Copyright © 2004 VenezuelAnalysis.com.


Articles by: Roy S. Carson

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