

US Deploying Military Personnel to Syrian-Jordanian Border

A long-planned attempt to spur defections, divide and destroy Syria, as articulated in Brookings Institution's "Assessing Options for Regime Change."

By [Tony Cartalucci](#)

Global Research, October 11, 2012

Region: [Middle East & North Africa](#)

Theme: [US NATO War Agenda](#)

In-depth Report: [SYRIA](#)

While the idea of a buffer zone is meant to look like a knee-jerk reaction to recent escalations, in reality this has been planned since at least March 2012, when the idea was proposed by the corporate-financier funded Brookings Institution in their "Middle East Memo #21" "[Assessing Options for Regime Change](#)" where it stated specifically (emphasis added):

"An alternative is for diplomatic efforts to focus first on how to end the violence and how to gain humanitarian access, as is being done under Annan's leadership. This may lead to the creation of safe-havens and humanitarian corridors, which would have to be backed by limited military power. This would, of course, fall short of U.S. goals for Syria and could preserve Asad in power. From that starting point, however, it is possible that a broad coalition with the appropriate international mandate could add further coercive action to its efforts." -[page 4, Assessing Options for Regime Change, Brookings Institution](#).

Saving Syria: Assessing Options for Regime Change

Daniel Byman, Michael Doran, Kenneth Pollack, and Salman Shaikh

SYRIA IS TRAPPED ON A CRUMBLING PRECIPICE, and however it might fall will entail significant risks for the United States and for the Syrian people.

The brutal regime of Bashar al-Assad is employing its loyal military forces and sectarian thugs to crush the opposition and reassert its tyranny. Even if Bashar fails, Syria may not be out of the woods: an increasingly likely alternative to the current regime is a bloody civil war similar to what we saw in Lebanon, Bosnia, Congo, and most recently in Iraq. The horrors of such a war might even exceed the brutal reassertion of Assad's control, and would cause spillover into Syria's neighbors—Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel—that could be disastrous for them and for American interests in the Middle East.¹

But the unrest in Syria, which is now entering its second year, also offers some important opportunities, ones that would come from the fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad, whose family has ruled the country with an iron grip for over forty years. Syria is Iran's oldest and most important ally in the Arab world, and the Iranian regime has doubled down on Assad, providing him with financial aid and military support to shore up his regime. Assad's departure would deal a significant blow to Tehran, further isolating it at a time when it has few friends in the region or the world. In addition, Damascus is steadfast in its hostility toward Israel, and Assad's regime is also a longtime supporter of terrorist groups like Hizballah and Hamas, and has at times aided al-Qa'ida terrorists and former regime

elements in Iraq. The regime's collapse, therefore, could have significant benefits for the United States and its allies in the region.

Actually ousting Assad, however, will not be easy. Although the Obama administration has for months called for Assad to go, every policy option to remove him is flawed, and some could even make the situation worse—seemingly a recipe for inaction. Doing nothing, however, means standing by while Assad murders his own people, and Syria plunges into civil war and risks becoming a failed state. Already the violence is staggering: as of March 2012, at least 8,000 Syrians have died and thousands more have been arrested and tortured in trying to topple the regime. At the same time, Syria is fragmenting. The Syrian opposition remains divided, and the Free Syrian Army is more a brand than a meaningful, unified force. Al-Qa'ida is urging fighters to join the fray in Syria, and sectarian killings and atrocities are growing. Should the violence continue to intensify, Syria's neighbors may increase their meddling, and instability could spread, further weakening already-fragile neighbors like Iraq and Lebanon.

So to protect U.S. interests, Assad cannot triumph. But a failed Syria, one wracked by civil war, would be just as bad. Thus, U.S. policy must walk this tightrope, trying to remove Assad, but doing so in a way that keeps Syria an intact state capable of policing its borders and ensuring order at home. At the end of the day, however, removing Assad may not be doable

Image: The Brookings Institution, Middle East Memo #21 "[Assessing Options for Regime Change \(.pdf\)](#)," makes no secret that the humanitarian "responsibility to protect" is but a pretext for long-planned regime change.

....

See also Video: Geopolitical analyst and photojournalist [Nile Bowie](#) brings up long-documented plans by the West to carve out "buffer zones" within Syria to further project power against Damascus, betraying the narrative that recent escalations are spontaneous

Brookings continues by describing how Turkey's aligning of vast amounts of weapons and troops along its border in coordination with Israeli efforts in the south of Syria, could help

effect violent regime change in Syria:

In addition, Israel's intelligence services have a strong knowledge of Syria, as well as assets within the Syrian regime that could be used to subvert the regime's power base and press for Asad's removal. Israel could posture forces on or near the Golan Heights and, in so doing, might divert regime forces from suppressing the opposition. This posture may conjure fears in the Asad regime of a multi-front war, particularly if Turkey is willing to do the same on its border and if the Syrian opposition is being fed a steady diet of arms and training. Such a mobilization could perhaps persuade Syria's military leadership to oust Asad in order to preserve itself. Advocates argue this additional pressure could tip the balance against Asad inside Syria, if other forces were aligned properly.
-[page 6, Assessing Options for Regime Change, Brookings Institution](#).

Foreign troops in Jordan, including US troops, may be playing a role in providing additional pressure south of Syria while Turkey attempts to pressure Syria from the north. The idea is to stretch out Syrian forces, relieving NATO-backed terrorists operating within the country. Of course, while the Western media claims these are merely troops helping with "humanitarian" concerns, they are undoubtedly doing all in their power to present Syria with a credible threat to force Syria to divide its troops, while attempting to stoke paranoia and panic in the minds of Syrian officers and politicians the West hopes to lure into defecting.

In response, Syria and its allies must provide a mutually convincing deterrent against this build-up and the threat it is meant to generate. With the fact that the West is openly arming, funding, and backing terrorists groups linked directly to Al Qaeda, not only in Syria, [but in Libya](#), as well as their recent announcement of the [delisting of terror group Mujahedeen e-Khalq \(MEK\)](#), it would not be difficult for Syria's allies to build up international support to send a monitoring group, only upon Damascus' request, to address in reality the humanitarian concerns on Syria's borders the West is only feigning to address. The presence of this monitoring group, which might include armed elements, would raise the stakes for Western policy makers and their proxies, and would discourage the influx of weapons and foreign fighters that have been costing Syrians their lives for over a year.

US policy openly states that it would prefer "bleeding" Syria to death over the long term, even if it could not succeed in exacting regime change, thus betraying their narrative of attempting to end a "humanitarian" crisis.

On pages 8 and 9, the US Brookings Institution's "Middle East Memo #21" "[Assessing Options for Regime Change](#)" it specifically states:

"The United States might still arm the opposition even knowing they will probably never have sufficient power, on their own, to dislodge the Asad network. Washington might choose to do so simply in the belief that at least providing an oppressed people with some ability to resist their oppressors is better than doing nothing at all, even if the support provided has little chance of turning defeat into victory. Alternatively, the United States might calculate that it is still worthwhile to pin down the Asad regime and bleed it, keeping a regional adversary weak, while avoiding the costs of direct intervention."
-[pages 8-9, Assessing Options for Regime Change, Brookings Institution](#).

Clearly, the West's "humanitarian concerns" are a poorly dressed pretext for the absolute

destruction of Syria through the intentional prolonging of violence and its ravaging effects for as long as possible. Clearly those implicated in this conspiracy demonstrably being carried out by the US, UK, France, NATO and its Persian Gulf allies of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, should play no further role in attempting to resolve violence in Syria they admit to starting and seeking to indefinitely perpetuate. This role should be granted instead to [a growing, multipolar effort](#) being led by Russia, Iran, and China.

The failure of international law is now on full display in Syria. With Western nations clearly dominating the United Nation's agenda, and the supranational institutions that surround it, overt criminal conspiracies have been allowed to unfold not only without consequence, but without even simple condemnation. The US in particular, through its policy think-tank Brookings Institution, has put to paper designs to perpetuate a humanitarian catastrophe indefinitely – not to protect civilian life, but simply to achieve a self-serving geopolitical objective – “to keep a regional adversary weak.” An alternative must be found, one based on the unwavering primacy of national sovereignty, not international law, where extraterritorial transgressions like those committed by the West toward Syria can never be justified nor tolerated.

The original source of this article is Global Research
Copyright © [Tony Cartalucci](#), Global Research, 2012

[Comment on Global Research Articles on our Facebook page](#)

[Become a Member of Global Research](#)

Articles by: [Tony Cartalucci](#)

Disclaimer: The contents of this article are of sole responsibility of the author(s). The Centre for Research on Globalization will not be responsible for any inaccurate or incorrect statement in this article. The Centre of Research on Globalization grants permission to cross-post Global Research articles on community internet sites as long the source and copyright are acknowledged together with a hyperlink to the original Global Research article. For publication of Global Research articles in print or other forms including commercial internet sites, contact: publications@globalresearch.ca

www.globalresearch.ca contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available to our readers under the provisions of "fair use" in an effort to advance a better understanding of political, economic and social issues. The material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving it for research and educational purposes. If you wish to use copyrighted material for purposes other than "fair use" you must request permission from the copyright owner.

For media inquiries: publications@globalresearch.ca