

The Empire's Favorite Latin American Dictators

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Nicaraguan dictator Somoza (Senior), or about the Dominican tyrant Trujillo: "He may be a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch". It has become a usual strategy for the US to place a stake on this category of associates in international affairs... The US guarantees every new "son of a bitch" that he will retain power if he supports the US geo-strategic interests, participates in undermining operations against the regimes and political leaders "unfriendly" to the Empire and ensures its interests in his country.

The US special services have wide incriminating evidence against

Alvaro Uribe Velez, second last president of Columbia. In the intelligence report "Important Columbian narco-traffickers", declassified by Pentagon in 1991, Uribe is listed under N 82: "A Columbian politician and senator, dedicated to collaboration with Medellin cartel at high government levels. Involved in narcotic activities in the US. His father was murdered in Columbia for his connection with narcotic traffickers. He is close personal friend of (the drug-lord) Pablo Escobar Gaviria, participated in Escobar's political campaign".

In March 1984, the Columbian authorities seized Escobar's drug laboratory, confiscating 14 tons of cocaine as well as several planes and helicopters. Among them was a Hughes 500 helicopter, which belonged to the family of Uribe. No one raised any claims against Alvaro back then. Moreover, he soon became the head of the national civil aviation. It was he who allowed his narco-companions to use national landing strips and field airdromes. This is where financial well-being of Uribe and his clan come from.

During his two presidential terms - from 2002 to 2010 - Uribe fervently performed his duties of Washington's puppet opposing the integration processes in the region which did not envisage the participation of the US. Uribe obstinately interfered with ALBA bloc - the Bolivarian alliance for Latin American nations. The relations of the Columbian leader with Hugo Chavez, Rafael Korrea, Evo Morales, Daniel Ortega, Fidel and Raul Castro, became more and more tensed. The official excuse for the confrontation was ALBA's secret cooperation with Columbian guerilla FARC-ELN groups. Uribe demanded that ALBA states should take after recognize those groups as "terrorist groups", just like the US did, and to support Columbia in its course for a complete defeat of the rebels.

Uribe said "yes" to the proposal of Pentagon and CIA to liquidate temporary headquarters of FARC in a hard-to-reach bordering area in Ecuador. The operation was conducted by the US air forces and a group of Columbian commandos. Among dozens of guerillas who were killed was commandant Raul Reyes, who had been authorized by FARC to start the process of peaceful settlement of the conflict. Bush administration achieved the result it wanted to

achieve: the situation in the region reached the critical point and the threat of a military conflict between Columbia, Ecuador and Venezuela became real as never before. Military units, including tank units, received orders to head forward to protect the borders. The possibility of a local war between “sudacas” (a contemptuous name US diplomats and military men give to South American people), was regarded by Washington’s “hawks” as an acceptable option to “untie knots” in relations with “populist regimes”. The first shots on the Columbian-Ecuadorian and Columbian Venezuelan borders grounded Pentagon’s plan to establish military bases in Columbia and other countries of South America and the Caribbean basin. Opportunities opened up to directly enter the conflict, and among other things to gain control over the oil fields in Venezuela and Ecuador.

WikiLeaks disclosures did not include the secret documents of Pentagon and CIA, which touched upon the escalation of the military conflict, steps of the parties of the conflict and scenarios of further confrontation. These “explosive” documents are unlikely to be declassified in the coming decade. But the participants of those events on the side of Columbia sooner or later may witness a trial on the war that was planned did not break out, the inflammatory role of the US military officials in Columbia and the backdoor maneuvers of Uribe, who tried to make Ecuador and Venezuela unleash the war.

Uribe’s “track record” includes many other campaigns on undermining stability and order in the “populist” countries. It was with the consent of Uribe that the agencies of DAS (security agency of Columbia) were set up in all Latin American countries with big communities of Columbian refugees. The agencies carries out only surveillance activities but under Bush’s war-on-terror doctrine did not exclude “physical neutralization” of the most dangerous “extremists”.

Venezuela is the country which ahs the largest Columbian community. At least 4 million people settled down in the Bolivarian republic, saving themselves from the governmental repressions due to “links with guerillas”, the revenge of narco-cartels and ultra-right armed groups. The US and Columbian special services use this situation sending the “paramilitares” units to Venezuela. Their goals are destabilization of the situation in the bordering states, economic diversion (smuggling of petrol and food products), kidnapping. Via DAS channels Uribe knew that a “paramilitares” group of more than hundred people was preparing to attack the presidential palace Miraflores and to kill president Chavez. The Columbian militants used Venezuelan uniform and weapons in order to imitate a spontaneous uprising of the Venezuelan servicemen unhappy with Chavez “communist” policy. Uribe did not mind: may be this time it would be a success. But the plan failed and the militants were arrested near the Venezuelan capital of Caracas right before the attack.

Uribe failed to ensure his reelection for the third term - the Constitutional court of Columbia opposed it. The facts of Uribe regime’s crimes began to float to the surface: graves of thousands of victims, mopping up of Columbians who were represented as guerillas, murders of opponents, trade union and student activists, reporters, representatives of the organizations of native Indian residents of Venezuela. Such practices were used by Americans when they fought guerilla movements in Latin America in 1950-1980s. Uribe added these methods to his arsenal without hesitation. In the long view, the investigation into hacking of phone calls of parliamentary members, officials of General prosecutor’s office, judges and reporters may also have negative consequences for the ex-president. Uribe says he did not give such orders. But the arrest of his personal secretary Bernardo Morena, ex DAS- chief Maria del Pilar Hurtado’s fleeing the country and getting a political

asylum in Panama shows the opposite: “phone hacking” took place following the order from Narino palace.

The US government appreciated services of one of its “sons of a bitch”: when his presidential term expired Uribe became a lecturer in one of the US universities and was given a camouflage of a UN official.

The new president Juan Manuel Santos, who was Defense Minister in Uribe’s government, gave up (evident) confrontation with ALBA. Santos met Chaves, signed documents on normalization of relations and cooperation in different fields, including security. Uribe took it as a “betrayal”. With explicit irritation Uribe took the investigations of cases of corruption during his rule and links of his sons with narco-mafia.

Columbian political analysts mark signs of “psychosis” in Uribe’s behavior, who continues to verbally attack Chavez in public once he has an opportunity for it. This happens despite the agreement between Santos and Chavez that Chavez will refrain from critical remarks about the ex-president. The Venezuelan president keeps his word and for Santos Uribe’s verbal attacks become more and more serious problem. Uribe continues to interfere in other issues of domestic and foreign policy of his country.

It has been noticed that Uribe tries not to stay at one place for a long time. He is always on the road as if he is covering up traces. US bodyguards of the former president of Columbia stay sharp all the time – the possibility of guerillas’ revenge for the death of commandant Reyes is very high.

Uribe even manages his estate Uberrimo by phone. He fears for his life because he knows that FARC has its people everywhere. On the same reason the former president spent in total not more than a week in his house located on the territory of the police complex in the north of Bogota. Though this complex is regarded to be unassailable, Uribe prefers not to tempt his fate. Enemies are everywhere. He cannot be 100% confident counting on CIA. The fate of Panama’s president Noriega constantly reminds him on gringo’s double games. Noriega made a slip and was punished for it despite his previous merits and a long term he served in prison in the US. Even that many regarded Noriega as the Empire’s favorite “son of a bitch” ...

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