

# Kiev Regime's "Upcoming Counteroffensive", Assessing Russia's "Military Industrial Complex".

Military Expert's Opinion – Interview

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*For over half a year, the mainstream propaganda machine has been reporting on the "upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive". The autumn offensive soon became a winter one, then a spring one and now it's a "grand" summer offensive. Each was supposed to be "decisive" and "a turning point" that would result in "a complete defeat for Russia". Credit should certainly be given to the endless self-confidence of those who truly believe that. However, unlike in regular civilian life, self-confidence in war gets people killed and, according to various sources and estimates, this has resulted in close to 200,000 KIA (killed in action) for the Kiev regime forces by now, with the figure for those wounded being not far from half a million.*

Such disastrous numbers beg the obvious question – how could the Neo-Nazi junta ever hope to conduct a counteroffensive of any kind, much less a successful one? To answer this question in an unbiased and informed way, we have decided to interview [KRN, a Belgrade-based military-focused think tank that includes experts from various fields](#), including missile technologies, military aviation, naval and land warfare, etc. One of their leading members, Captain Liner, is an expert in all of the aforementioned fields of military science and has graciously offered us his take on the ever-upcoming counteroffensive of the Kiev regime forces and how it might play out.

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Drago Bosnic (DB): Captain, first and foremost, thank You for taking the time to conduct this interview and give us Your informed opinion on this hotly debated and largely controversial topic.

Captain Liner (CL): Thank You for the invitation. Right off the bat, I would like to point out

that [KRN has existed for years](#) and we have been approached many times by various news outlets. However, our style of reporting and research isn't very suitable for the largely sensationalist media, which is why we heavily scrutinize everyone before accepting such proposals. It's very difficult to come across media that allows unbiased reporting and analyses. We all have our own biases and emotionally charged opinions. However, that does not prevent us from looking at things objectively and from multiple angles, regardless of whether anyone likes it or not.

DB: That's precisely why we highly appreciate Your expertise. So let's dive straight into our questions. Depending on varying estimates, the political West has provided upwards of \$150 billion to the Kiev regime, which is well over double the nominal annual military budget of Russia. Still, the successes of the Kiev regime forces are sorely lacking. How so?

CL: Money being the decisive parameter of military power is one of the most common misconceptions that we see everywhere nowadays. As you said, estimates do vary significantly and if we were to believe them, we'd think that Russia is truly doomed in its geopolitical struggle with the West. I mean, how is it even possible for a country that has consistently been outspent by 20-25 times for over 30 years to even stand a chance against the unified might of NATO and its international partners? Well, the answer lies in the very idea that Russia is spending 20-25 times less. Nominally, it does. However, that says nothing of the actual state of its military.

Firstly, Russia inherited one of the largest and most advanced MICs (Military Industrial Complexes) in the world. The Soviet Union invested a massive portion of its economic output into its military and by the late 1980s, it had by far the largest and most powerful armed force in the history of man. Even the current collective strength of NATO pales in comparison to what the USSR had at the time. And when I say that Russia inherited it all, even that is a somewhat erroneous term, as the people and resources didn't actually move anywhere, but largely stayed in the same place and continued extremely sensitive work for the country even during the troublesome 1990s, as evidenced by Russia's massive advantage in fields such as hypersonic weapons.

In fact, spies from all over the world are trying to get that know-how, including those from some countries that are virtually allied to Russia. Countries that have massive economies and much larger pools of human resources than Russia itself. However, this accumulated knowledge cannot simply be bought with money. It requires much more than that. Additionally, the Russian economy is not based on abstract ideas such as those in the West, dominated by financial institutions and what I like to call "gloeconomic gambling". This is why the Russian military hasn't had shortages of weapons and ammunition due to production problems.

If there were any, they were largely a matter of logistics and/or bureaucratic constraints, problems which have been resolved by now, hopefully. On the other hand, the billions for Ukraine that you're talking about are just digits on a computer screen somewhere in New York City. And even in the case all that phantom money existed in reality, it means literally nothing for the common soldier in the trenches. Rifles and howitzers don't shoot dollars. Jets don't run on them either. What you really need is metal for bullets and shells, chemical compounds for the explosive, jet fuel for aircraft, etc. That needs to come from somewhere and Ukraine hasn't gotten nearly enough to meet its needs, particularly if they were to conduct a counteroffensive against a military such as that of Russia.

DB: On that note, many largely impartial analysts, particularly those from Asia, insist that the probability of a successful advance deep into Russian positions is extremely low and that the supply of the necessary weapons and ammunition for this kind of large-scale military operation may take more than two years. What is Your opinion on this matter?

CL: I largely agree with such assessments. What's more, I think it's not just that it may take longer than two years, but whether it's even possible. Ukrainians simply don't have the logistical capacity and sustainability for such an endeavor, even if the Russians were to suddenly stop all long-range strikes on the battered logistics that Ukraine already has. Russian kamikaze drones, glide bombs and long-range artillery and missiles have proven to be particularly effective in disrupting Ukrainian supply lines. Obviously, this doesn't mean there won't be any attacks [by Ukraine], but those can hardly be considered serious offensive operations. In simpler terms, a counteroffensive that would suppress the Russians on a wider front is unfeasible.

Ukrainians cannot support the dynamics of advancement either in width or in depth, they cannot logistically cover mass movements, but more importantly, they cannot establish a stable rear. In fact, for the counteroffensive to make sense at all, they would first have to disrupt both Russian logistics and the rear, as well as cut their lines of communication. But how can they achieve this? With what? Apart from the relatively regular reconnaissance-in-force (RIF) and occasional temporary salients, there's nothing even remotely resembling offensive operations. Surely, long-range weapons supplied by the West can hit things here and there, but this cannot disrupt Russian logistics, let alone bog down the entire Russian military.

It seems to me that the Russian side understands this much better. For example, when they pulled back from the right bank of the Kherson oblast (region), this was precisely due to logistics and the danger of flooding due to Ukrainian attacks on the Kakhovka dam. The Russians were able to stabilize the frontline along a very defensible natural barrier. On the other hand, the Ukrainians couldn't stabilize their own lines even when they were defending, where these lines of defense and rear were shortening, let alone now when they are planning to attack and where the aforementioned lines would be stretching and extending.

However, as I said already, this doesn't mean that Ukrainian forces cannot advance anywhere. They could get deeper into some areas, but how will they hold them? This is why we're seeing a lot of these incursions that simply end in virtually immediate withdrawal. Still, such attacks cannot be considered a true counteroffensive. A counteroffensive is a large-scale military operation that ideally results in permanent gains. However, for the sake of semantics, optics and propaganda, they could call it a "counteroffensive".

A real large-scale operation involving tens of thousands of soldiers and hundreds of tanks can certainly be successful, as it's exceptionally difficult to defend against such attacks. Still, the cost of such an operation, in terms of both manpower and resources, is what tells us how successful it truly is, as losing thousands of soldiers for several square kilometers of grassland or concrete rubble begs the obvious question – is it worth it? My impression is that much of what we're seeing from Ukraine is made for the purposes of information warfare.

DB: Since You've mentioned the Kherson oblast, how likely is an offensive in that direction?

CL: In simplest possible terms, it can be said that it would literally be a suicide mission. When the right bank of the Dnieper River, along with the city of Kherson, was abandoned

last year by General Surovikin's decision, many saw that move as a shame and a defeat, but in fact, that secured Russian positions on the left bank and even the Crimean peninsula itself. The Dnieper River is over one kilometer wide in some places, which absolutely negates the possibility of setting up pontoon crossings, while sending small detachments in fast boats has already proved to be a suicide mission a couple of times. In addition, any idea that the Ukrainian Air Force can support such advances is not even worth discussing considering the power of Russian fighter jets and air defense systems.

DB: How about Zaporozhye and/or Donbass?

CL: The Zaporozhye direction might be the best option realistically speaking, because in case of a breakthrough, the AFU [Armed Forces of Ukraine] could reach the Sea of Azov and thus threaten the Donetsk region from the south, as well as Crimea itself, which would lose its land connection with Russia. The left bank of the Dnieper would also be exposed in that case and, once again, the Crimean peninsula too, which would then be left with the Crimean Bridge as the only connection with Russia, putting it at considerable risk because we should not forget that the UK delivered "Storm Shadow" cruise missiles to Ukraine. However, anticipating all this, Russia built several lines of defense in the area [of Zaporozhye], making them virtually impossible to break through. Ukraine will certainly try, but the price of each attempt would be very, very costly.

As for the Donetsk direction, offensive operations in this area are the most likely scenario, especially through Avdeyevka and Maryinka. However, as Avdeyevka is in a semi-encirclement, it would be necessary to first break through that semi-encirclement and then threaten the city of Donetsk itself. Almost the same applies to Maryinka, although the situation is a bit different, as Ukrainians still hold about 15% of the settlement and are constantly sending in reinforcements. And while this direction may be the most suitable for a counteroffensive, since the fall of Artyomovsk (Bakhmut), Russian aviation and artillery have been keeping Ukrainians at bay. Individual RIF and attempts to break through yield no results and any larger grouping of armored forces leads to the danger of repeating the same mistakes as in the Zaporozhye and Donetsk directions.

DB: What about the possibility of an all-out attack on regions such as Belgorod, Bryansk and/or Kursk?

CL: Apart from the headline-grabbing information warfare that I already mentioned, I find it extremely unlikely to see a large-scale offensive on regions in Russia proper. First of all, there's no way to justify such a move and second, what would be the strategic goal of such an offensive, provided it would even be successful (which is effectively impossible)? Where would the Ukrainian military stop in the extremely improbable case they conquer all border areas? Not to mention that this would also enrage the Russian people and further rally them to support their government, the same one that has been warning them about the dangers of NATO expansionism for decades. Mind you, all this is without even taking into account Russia's reaction, as Moscow certainly wouldn't be sitting idly while its territories are under attack and/or occupation.

DB: How likely is the possibility of an uncontrollable escalation between NATO and Russia if the counteroffensive fails?

CL: This is perhaps the most complex and by far the most important question of all. What we're seeing now is that certain global powers simply don't want to find a way to defuse

tensions and negotiate a reasonable, mutually beneficial settlement with their strategic adversaries. On the contrary, escalation seems to be the only vector of their geopolitical engagements. Perhaps most disturbingly, many in Washington and Brussels have directly linked their political fates to that of Kiev authorities, meaning that if Ukraine loses, this would also inevitably result in irreparable damage to their political careers and influence. Last year we saw a dramatic increase in political instability in the West, including the fall of several prominent governments in various major Western European countries.

DB: What can Moscow do to stop or at least severely hamper the political West's ability to arm the Kiev regime?

CL: This is directly tied to the previous question. I don't think there's an easy answer, because if there was one, it would've been implemented by now. I'm sure the Russian military and intelligence services are perfectly aware of which Western weapons are entering Ukraine and where exactly they are stored. The reason why Russia is probably not targeting the logistics of this truly massive operation is the fact that Ukraine simply uses the civilian infrastructure for this purpose, meaning that Russia would need to destroy it. And even if it did, Ukraine would just switch to another one. However, this certainly doesn't mean that Russia is letting the West arm Ukraine with impunity. Whenever there's a larger concentration of munitions and other weapons, either Russian aviation or ground-based missiles rain down and destroy the facilities those are stored in.

DB: Captain, thank You for this truly informative and in-depth point of view. It was a pleasure.

CL: Thank You for the invitation.

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