Greek Parliament Passes Debt Agreement: Omitted Euro – Sovereignty Dimensions
By Dr. Christof Lehmann
Global Research, July 18, 2015
nsnbc 17 July 2015
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The Greek Syriza government of PM Alexis Tsipras passed legislation to adopt the EU’s economic package. Splitting Syriza, Tsipras had to draw on votes from the right. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble revealed that many in Germany actually might prefer Greece to leave the euro. While Schäuble is being widely criticized, it is generally omitted that the euro was forced on Germany as a precondition for Germany’s reunification. The crisis opens a Pandora’s box of questions about Greek, German, European, and by implication, Western African nation’s sovereignty and representative democracy.

Schäuble - Not an easy character to understand but also a scapegoat?  Courtesy EPA, Kay Nietfield.

Schäuble – Not an easy character to understand but also a scapegoat? Courtesy EPA, Kay Nietfield.

Tsipras and the Greek parliament’s passing of legislation to approve the EU program sparked widespread protests in Athens and other European capitals. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble would tentatively imply that the package had been crafted to poise Greece towards a Grexit, saying that  an exit from the currency union might be the better alternative for Greece and its citizens. Schäuble’s assessment is consistent with an IMF report that called the terms of the EU – Greek deal unrealistic.

Germany was forced to accept the euro. So far to what is being reported by European and global media and policymakers. What is largely being omitted is that Germany was not fond of giving up the D-Mark and that the euro was imposed on Germany by the Thatcher and Mitterand governments and as a precondition for the German reunification. Former German Chancellor Helmuth Kohl wrote in his biography that Mitterand implicitly threatened Germany by saying that unless Germany would accept the euro, it would find itself as isolated as it was in 1913 – the year before WW I .

A few German “experiences”? Other German “experiences” would include the assassination of the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Deutsche Bank Alfred Herrenhusen in 1989.  The assassination, which was blamed on the militant German left RAF came only days after Herrenhausen suggested that international banks should work towards a debt moratorium for third world countries.

Cognizant of the consequences of the impeding breakdown of the USSR and the GDR (East Germany), Herrenhausen had also suggested the establishment of a European Development Bank, thus challenging the primacy of the US-dominated IMF. No positive proof that the RAF, Hezbollah, or the GDR’s Stasi had been involved was ever tested in a court of law. Many analysts suggest the involvement of NATO intelligence.

Another German “experience” is the unsolved assassination of Detlev Karsten Rohwedder in 1991. Rohwedder was the manager of the Treuhandanstalt – the institution that was responsible for the privatization of East German businesses. Rohwedder pleaded for a socially responsible transition and was opposed the “economic hit-men” policies that were especially led by foreign cartels. The Eastern German economy was devastated, leading to extreme high unemployment, poverty and the rise of right-wing radicalism. The RAF would also be blamed for the Rohwedder assassination which it rejected as preposterous.

A question of sovereignty and democracy, not only for Greece.

The function of Thatcher’s and Mitterand’s demand that Germany would implement the euro was to negate any future attempt of Germany to regain legal and actionable sovereignty and to prevent Germany from assuming a position as a European power and bridge between the East and the West.

Forming the Eurozone, all of the core EU member States gave up much of their economic sovereignty and autonomy. Joining the Eurozone implied stringent rules to all of the constituents, although there were no mechanisms put in place that would make these rules easily enforceable. The result was the hollowing out of national central banks and the pooling of monetary decisions – with some exceptions.

The UK did not join the euro. France is vehemently opposing any EU, especially German initiatives that would have France reconsider its virtually absolute control over the economies of its former West African Colonies via the UMEOA. Numerous, including French experts would note that the economy of France would be worse than that of Greece, was it not for the fact that France maintains what West Africans describe as “French Finance Nazism”

Considering what some would perceive as a trend of German-bashing, these factors may put the hard-line of Schäuble or Merkel into perspective. That, not to mention that the UN Charter still designates Germany as enemy State to the UN and that Germany cannot make independent decisions on a wide variety of policies.

Greece has been the country that has been hardest hit by a manipulated international crisis that set in 2007 -8. Greece has also been the European country that has been hardest hit by a failing austerity policy. Blaming any particular country for the situation in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy.. is popular but negligent of the functions of the IMF, the ECB, the European Commission, and not least the role of predominantly Wall Street and City of London-based banks and oligarchs in bringing about the “crisis”.

Greek PM Alexis Tsipras is being blamed for accepting the EU package. One of the largely omitted facts was that Greece, as Europe is currently constructed, had very little room for a viable fallback strategy and most importantly, viable assets to bargain with.

The Greek crisis, if anything, shows that the EU urgently needs a reassessment with regard to national sovereignty – an issue that will be difficult if not impossible to address as long as the economic motor of the EU, Germany has not regained its sovereignty.

Other omitted facts? Chancellor Merkel’s statement that Germany would not mind if any nations would seek association with both the EU and the newly formed EEU. Good and well 50% of Germans do not perceive Germany as solidly and permanently anchored within NATO.

About 50% of Germans would like to see Germany at equal distance and with equally good relations to Washington and Moscow. Ultimately, the weakening of the euro may very well be a function of the attempt to save the primacy of the (f)ailing US dollar and Bretton Woods – and Greece is, together with other European nations including Germany at the receiving end of this policy.

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